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THE RIGHT OF AN EJECTED TICKET-HOLDER TO RECOVER IN TORT
The right of the holder of a ticket of admission to a theater
or other place of amusement to recover in a tort action for un-
warranted expulsion has been a topic of much discussion since
the case of Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd.' This decision
apparently overruled what had been the established doctrine in
1 [ig95] i K. B. i. Here a person actually paid admission to a moving-
picture show, but the doorkeeper, thinking that he had not paid for the
seat occupied, laid hands upon him to secure his removal by force. The
patron yielded and went out. It was held, Phillimore, L. J., dissenting,
that the patron was entitled to recover substantial damages for the assault.
The defendant sought to justify the removal on the ground that the plain-
tiff's license had been revoked. The two concurring judges, however,
after discussing the rule of Wood v. Leadbitter, concluded that the pur-
chaser of the ticket obtained a license to witness the performance from
beginning to end, and that the license included a contract not to revoke it
arbitrarily during the performance.
[3951
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England since at least 1845 when Wood v. Leadbitter2 was
decided.
A very similar situation seems to have been presented to the
Supreme Court of South Carolina in Metts v. Charleston Theater
Co.3  In this case the defendant sold the plaintiff a ticket in
advance for an advertised performance. The ticket was duly
accepted at the entrance and the seat occupied during a part
of the performance. Upon the arrival of another person who
showed a ticket entitling him to the same seat for the same per-
formance, it was discovered that the ticket seller had made a
mistake and given the plaintiff a ticket for a previous date.
Nothing appeared on the ticket to put the purchaser on notice
of the error. The plaintiff was forced to relinquish her seat and
to suffer great humiliation in being escorted from the theater by
a policeman.
In affirming the trial court's award of actual and punitive
damages for the improper expulsion, the Supreme -Court ap-
parently assumed that the so-called "license" to enter and remain,
which the patron had secured, might be revoked at any time
(according to the doctrine of Wood v. Leadbitter), but con-
cluded, curiously enough, that there was no evidence showing
such a revocation. If such were the case, obviously an action
for assault could be maintained and damages recovered for the
indignities and humiliation suffered because of the defendant's
conduct. The facts of the case, however, would seem to disclose
abundant evidence to support the defendant's contention that
there was a revocation. In short, it would appear that the court,
being impressed by the justice of the plaintiff's cause of action
but unable to free itself from the firmly-embedded notion that
a "license" not coupled with a grant under seal is revocable at
the will of the licensor, adopted this convenient solution. Other
courts had already blazed this path.4
2 (1845) 13 M. & W. 838. In this case the plaintiff paid admission to a
horse race, and without in any way having misconducted himself was
ejected from the grandstand with no unnecessary violence. The court
decided that no recovery could be had as there was no assault, for, by
purchasing a ticket for admission, the plaintiff obtained only a license,
which was revocable at any time without refunding the money.
3 (i96) 89 S. E. (S. C.) 389.
4 Other cases adopting a like solution are Boswell v. Barnum & Bailey
(1916) I85 S. W. (Tenn.) 692; Weber-Stair Co. v. Fisher (iog) "9
S. W. (Ky.) i95; Walsh v. Hyde & B. Amusement Co. (i9o6) 113 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 42; McGoverny v. Staples (1870) 7 Alb. L. J. (N. Y.) 219.
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The reasoning and decisions of the courts on this question,
though usually convenient, have indeed been unsatisfactory and
confusing. Until the case of Hurst v. Picture Theaters, Ltd.,
it was generally asserted that the purchaser of a ticket to enter
and remain at a theater, circus, or racetrack possessed a mere
"revocable license"; that if the "license" was revoked and the
licensee ejected without unnecessary force his only remedy was
an action for breach of contract, and his damages were limited
to the price of the ticket or, at most, to any expense incident to
its purchase and attendance at the place of amusement.' It was
insisted, because of -the private character of the enterprise, that
there was no breach of legal duty either in refusing admission
to anyone or in expelling anyone after admission.
It is submitted that these decisions are erroneous and confus-
ing; that they have given rise to indistinctness of thought; that
they are the result of a failure to distinguish the mental and
physical phenomena from the resulting legal relations; and that
an accurate analysis of the legal relations created in a case similar
to the principal one will show that if A is on B's property by
"license" of B, such "license" cannot, for reasons which follow,
be revoked.
When A purchases a ticket to enter and occupy a seat in B's
theater, it is commonly asserted that A gets a mere "revocable
license." This is inaccurate. The term "license" is merely
descriptive of the group of operative facts which create in A
a "privilege" of entering and occupying the designated seat dur-
ing the performance.6  The operative facts referred to are, of
course, the payment of the consideration, the issuance of the
5 The leading cases upholding this doctrine are Wood v. Leadbitter,
supra; Meisner v. Detroit B. I. & W. Ferry Co. (19o8) 154 Mich. 545;
W. W. V. Co. v. Black (i912) 113 Va. 728; Marrone v. Washington
Jockey Club (1912) 227 U. S. 633; Taylor v. Cohn (i9o6) 47 Or. 538;
Horney v. Nixon (195o) 213 Pa. St. 20; Cornish v. Stubbs (187o) L. R.
5 C. P. 334; McCrea v. Marsh (1858) 12 Gray (Mass.) 21.
6 Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld in his article on Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1913) 23 YALE LAW
JouRNAL, 16, at p. 43 says: "The term 'license,' sometimes used as if
it were synonymous with 'privilege,' is not strictly appropriate. This
is simply another of those innumerable cases in which the mental and
physical facts are so frequently confused with the legal relations which
they create. Accurately used, license is a generic term to indicate a
group of operative facts required to create a particular privilege-this




ticket, proper behavior, etc. A having acquired this "privilege,"
B is obviously in a different position as regards A from what he
was before. B is now said to have a "no-right" that A should
not be there; or, in other words, A does not have a "duty" to
stay out of the theater, the "privilege" of entering being the
negation of the "duty" to stay out. Under the doctrine of Wood
v. Leadbitter, B would still possess a "power" of extinguishing
A's legal "privilege" and creating a "duty" in him to leave.
This same act would, of course, extinguish his own "no-right,"
and give rise to a "right" or "claim" that A depart. Wherever
the principles of equity are enforced, however, A's equitable
"privilege" will remain undefeated by B's legal "power." The
problem here is similar to that in the law of trusts where T
holds Blackacre in fee simple on a passive trust for C in fee
simple. C's equitable "privilege" of entering upon the land
conflicts with his legal "duty" to refrain from entering; and,
correlatively, T's equitable 'no-right" that C shall stay off the
land conflicts with his legal "right" that C shall stay off.7
In the case of the "license," suppose B should attempt to
revoke the so-called "license" and request A to depart, claiming
that the "privilege" acquired had been revoked. Equity would
restrain B from exercising his legal "power" and protect the
equitable "privilege" which, but for the absence of a seal, would
have been a grant at law." If -this be so, B in disturbing A in the
exercise of his "privilege" would commit an assault for which
he must pay damages.9
7 A similarly analogous problem is presented where T holds a bond-
obligation against C in trust for C. C's equitable "privilege" of not pay-
ing the amount thereof to T conflicts with his legal "duty" to do so;
and, correlatively, T's equitable "no-right" that C shall make such pay-
ment conflicts with his legal right. For an exhaustive treatment of this
whole problem, see Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld's article on The Rela-
tions Between Equity and Law (1913) ii Micn. L. REv. 537, especially
at pages 555 and 556.8 Parker, J., in Jones v. Tankerville [igog] 2 Ch. 440 at page 443, says:
"An injunction restraining the revocation of a license, when it is revo-
cable at law, may in a sense be called relief by way of specific per-
formance, but it is not specific performance in the sense of compelling
the vendor to do anything. It merely prevents him from breaking his
contract, and protects a right in equity which but for the absence of a
seal would be a right at law, and since the Judicature Act it may well be
doubted whether the absence of a seal in such a case can be relied on
in any court." The learned judge in speaking of a "right" in equity
is clearly referring to the "privilege" in the writer's analysis.
9 Section 25 of the Judicature Act of 1873 provides: "Generally in all
matters not hereinbefore particularly mentioned, in which there is an.v
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In this connection, it may be observed that if A elects to sue
in tort for the assault, he cannot also recover for a breach of
contract. Obviously one is inconsistent with the other. Never-
theless, the two recent devisions which have overthrown the
older common-law rule and permitted an action for assault, are
apparently inconsistent in allowing a further recovery for breach
of contract.10
It would seem -that at last the English courts, at least, are to
give the equitable considerations their true weight, and that the
rule in Hurst v. Picture Theaters, Ltd., will supplant that of
Wood v. Leadbitter. If this be so, it will no longer be necessary
for the courts -to adopt the convenient but misleading solution
employed in the principal case.
S. F. D.
THE WEBB-KENYON ACT AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE
In a recent case,' the United States Supreme Court (Mr.
Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Van Devanter, dissenting)
conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of the
common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity
shall prevail." Similarly Section 532 of the Connecticut General Statutes
provides: "All courts which are vested with jurisdiction both in law
and in equity may, to the full extent of their respective jurisdictions,
administer legal and equitable rights and apply legal and equitable reme-
dies, in favor of either party, in one and the same suit, so that legal and
equitable rights of the parties may be enforced and protected in one
action; but wherever there is any variance between the rules of equity
and the rules of the common law, in reference to the same matter, the
rules of equity shall prevail." It would be especially easy for a court
under the above statutes or similar ones to hold that while B may have
a right or claim to A's departure, his exercise of any force to bring
this about would amount to an assault.
10 Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd., supra; Barnswell v. National Amuse-
ment Co. (x915) 23 D. L. R. 615. In speaking of the question of damages,
in the former case Buckley, L. J., says: "The defendants had, I think,
for value contracted that the plaintiff should see a certain spectacle from
its commencement to its termination. They broke that contract, and it
was a tort on their part to remove him. They committed an assault upon
him in law." In the latter case, Martin, J. A., adopting the reasoning
in Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd., says: "As regards damages, the
amount awarded, $5o, would not justify our interference, because while
breach of contract would be inapplicable, yet the learned Judge has
obviously considered that the plaintiff was entitled to something appre-
ciable for the assault."
1 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. (1917) 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup.
Ct. Rep. i8o.
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upheld the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act 2 and finally
settled a very much disputed question relating to the power of
Congress to regulate interstate commerce. The court in its
decision construed the Webb-Kenyon Act as prohibiting the trans-
portation in interstate commerce of all liquor shipped into a
state in violation of the law of the state. The law of West
Virginia forbade the shipment of liquor into the state and the
receipt and possession of liquor so transported, without regard
to the use to which the liquor was to be put. It was, therefore,
decided that the provisions of the law of the state were made
applicable by the federal act.3 The effect of the Webb-Kenyon
Act is to remove the protection of the interstate commerce clause
from traffic in intoxicating liquors in certain cases.
As early as 1827, the Supreme Court held that a state did
not have the power to regulate and tax an importation from a
foreign country while the article taxed remained in the original
package.4 Contrary to a dictum laid down in the above case, a
state statute regulating original packages containing liquor was
declared to be within -the police power of the state." The License
Cases, however, were overruled in Leisy v. Hardin,6 which was
directly influenced by the earlier case of Bowman v. Chicago
R. R.7  The court held that not only had a state no power to
forbid the importation of intoxicating liquors ;s but it also lacked
the power to subject such a legitimate article of commerce to
state prohibition laws while it remained in the original package.9
The effect of these decisions was to call into existence the
2 "An act divesting intoxicating liquors of their interstate character in
certain cases." It forbids the shipment or transportation of intoxicating
liquors "from one State . . . into any other State, Territory, or Dis-
trict of the United States, . . . which is intended to be received, pos-
sessed, sold or in any manner used, either in the original package or other-
wise, in violation of any law of such State, Territory, or District of the
United States." 37 St. at L. 699, Act of Mar. I, 1913.
3 The Court thus overruled the case of Van Winkle v. State (1914)
27 Del. 578, which held that the Webb-Kenyon Act applied only when
liquor shipped in interstate commerce was intended to be used in viola-
tion of the law of the state, and did not apply to liquor shipped for
personal use.
4Brown v. Maryland (1827) 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 419.
5 License Cases (1847) 5 How. (U. S.) 504.
6 (89o) 135 U. S. Ioo.
7 (1888) 125 U. S. 465.
s Bowman v. Chicago R. R., supra.
9 Leisy v. Hardin, supra.
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Wilson Act,10 which provided that imported liquors shall, upon
arrival in a state, fall within the category of domestic articles
of a similar nature. Objections similar to those made to the
constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act were uinavailing, and
the case of In re Rahrer1 declared the Wilson Act valid. How-
ever, later cases showed the limited application of the act, and
in Rhodes v. Iowa, 1 2 the court decided that, although the Wilson
Act removed an impediment to the enforcement of state laws in
respect to imported packages in their original condition, yet
the states did not have the power, by virtue of the Wilson Act,
to pass laws preventing the importation of liquor from another
state. To meet the situation created by the above and later cases,
Congress finally enacted the Webb-Kenyon Act.
Many objections were urged against the constitutionality of
the act. It was originally vetoed by President Taft on the
grounds that the act operated to delegate power to the states,
and that it lacked uniformity.13 As early as 1851, the Supreme
Court, in considering the constitutionality of pilotage laws
enacted by the states, made the following classification:'4 "The
power to regulate commerce embraces . . . . various sub-
jects quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding
a uniform rule; . . . . and some, like the subject now in
question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone
can meet the local necessities of navigation. Whatever subjects
of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one
uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be
of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress."
The court thus held that the mere grant to Congress of the
power to regulate commerce did not deprive the states of the
power to regulate pilots. It was this classification that influenced
the court in Bowman v. Chicago R. R., and Leisy v. Hardin.
It was there said that intoxicating liquors were of such a nature
as to recjuire a uniform system among the states, and the power
to pass such legislation was vested exclusively in Congress. It
is interesting to note some of the state acts which were held,
nevertheless, to be valid and not encroachments upon the exclu-
sive power of Congress. The Supreme Court recognized the
10 (i8go) 26 St. at L. 313.
11 (1890 140 U. S. 545.
12 (1898) 170 U. S. 412.
13 49 Cong. Rec. 4291 ; see also article in 22 YALE LAW JouRNAL, 567.
14 Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1851) 12 How. (U. S.) 299.
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power of the state to pass a law, even in the absence of federal
legislation giving the state such authority, excluding and for-
bidding the importation into the state of oleomargarine, fraudu-
lently described as butter.15  The court held this was a valid
exercise of the police power of the state to prevent a deception
being practiced upon the public.
In the principal case, the court intimated that the Webb-
Kenyon Act did not lack uniformity: "So far as uniformiy is
concerned, there is no question that the Act uniformly applies
to the conditions which call its provisions into play-that its pro-
visions apply to all the states so that the question really is a com-
plaint as to the want of uniform existence of things to which the
Act applies and not to an absence of uniformity in the Act itself."
The court went further and denied that uniformity was an essen-
tial requisite to the constitutionality of statutes regulating com-
merce in intoxicationg liquors. "It is obvious," the court con-
tinued, "that the argument seeks to engraft upon the consti-
tution a restriction not found in it, that is, that the power to
regulate conferred upon Congress obtains subject to the require-
ment that regulations enacted shall be uniform throughout the
United States."
It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that the
general power conferred upon the legislature to make laws
cannot be delegated by that body to any other department or
authority.1 The court distinguished between a delegation of
power and a state regulation which derives its force from the
will of -Congress, and held that the Webb-Kenyon Act falls
within the second class. One of the outstanding features of the
act is the fact that its violation is not made a federal offense,
because it was passed simply to enable the various prohibition
states to enforce their prohibition laws in an effective manner.
It is the state that punishes the offender and not the federal
authorities. The act would, therefore, on first reflection appear
to confer power upon the states heretofore not possessed by them.
But it must be remembered that the states have always had the
power to pass laws prohibiting the sale and manufacture of liquor
within the state.'7  The Wilson Act removed one impediment
' Plumley v. Massachusetts (1894) 155 U. S. 461. The same result was
reached in Crossman v. Lurman (19o4) 192 U. S. I89 in the case of arti-
ficially colored coffee beans.
1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, p. 163.
'7 Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U. S. 623.
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that prevented the effective enforcement of state liquor laws;
the Webb Act went further and removed another impediment.
This can hardly be said to be a delegation of power. The Webb-
Kenyon Act differs radically from the Lottery' s and the Mann
"White Slave" Acts, 9 which forbid interstate traffic in lottery
tickets and in women, in that these federal statutes inhibit such
commerce entirely and make their violation federal offenses. Had
Congress exercised its power in reference to intoxicating liquors
in the same way, making a violation of the act a federal offense,
no question would have been raised as to the act being a delega-
tion of power. The constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon Act
would seem to follow as a logical and necessary development of
liquor legislation and judicial decisions in this country.
20
J. I. S.
POWER OF COURTS TO RENDER DECREES REGARDING THE DEVOLUTION
OF STOCK IN A FOREIGN CORPORATION
Charles Baker died in Tennessee, the owner of property in
that state, of stock in a Kentucky corporation, and of a claim for
surplus profits against the latter corporation. He had no chil-
dren, but left a widow in Tennessee and a mother in Kentucky.
His personal property, if distributable according to the law of
Tennessee, would have gone entirely to his widow; if distributable
according to Kentucky law, it would have been divided equally
between his widow and his mother. His widow, in a Tennessee
court, sued the intestate's mother who was asserting a half inter-
est in the personal estate. The mother was summoned by pub-
1s Act of Congress (1895) 28 U. S. St. at L. 963, c. 1g1; Champion v.
Ames (1903) 188 U. S. 320.
19 Act of Congress (June 25, 1910) 36 U. S. St. at L. 825, c. 395; Hoke
v. United States (x912) 227 U. S. 308. See also the Lacey Act, sec.
242 of Criminal Code of United States. This act prohibits the trans-
portation "in interstate commerce of animals or birds killed in violation
of the game laws of the various states. It has been sustained in Rupert
v. United States (i9io) 181 Fed. 87.
20 Australia, which has a constitution very similar to ours, has a gro-
vision therein covering the very situation that the Webb-Kenyon Act
provided for, viz.: "All fermented, distilled, or other intoxicating liquors
passing into any State or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale, or
storage, shall be subject to the laws of the states as if such liquids had
been produced in the State." Annotated Constitution of the Australian
Commonwealth (Quick and Carran) p. 277.
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lication. She failed to appear, and the court, after finding that
Baker had died domiciled in Tennessee, declared that the plaintiff
was entitled to have the stock transferred to her. Later the
widow, basing her claim upon the decree of the Tennessee court,
sued in a Kentucky court to compel the corporation to transfer
the stock to her. The defendant claimed that the Tennessee court
had had no jurisdiction to render the former decree. This view
was sustained by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The mother
came into the suit by an intervening petition in which she averred
that Baker died a resident of Kentucky and prayed for one-half
of the corporation stock. The court found that Baker had been
domiciled in Kentucky, and that the property should be dis-
tributed according to the Kentucky rule. On writ of error, the
United State Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the ground
that the Tennessee court was without jurisdiction to enter its
decree and that the Kentucky court had power to determine the
case.'
Jurisdiction is the power in a court to take valid action which
will be binding on the parties until set aside, or reversed by some
competent tribunal.2  Jurisdiction in rem always exists where
there is property within the territory of the state. A decree
affecting that property is valid even though the owner of it is
not within the state, provided he has been constructively served
with notice as required by statute.3
A court, however, cannot render a personal decree against an
absent non-domiciled foreigner unless he has been actually served
with process, or has voluntarily appeared in the suit.4 Even
though knowledge of the suit has actually been brought to the
defendant's notice, if he was beyond the territory of the state,
the court would have no power to render a decree in personam5
Applying these principles to the present case, we see that since
neither the corporation nor the mother appeared in the Tennessee
court, no personal decree could be binding on them.
At least for the purpose of founding administration, debts are
considered as assets at the domicile of the debtor." The state
I Baker v. Baker Eccles and Co. (Jan. 8, 1917) 242 U. S. 394, 37 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 152.2 In re Sawyer (I888) 124 U. S. 200; Prof. Walter W. Cook, The
Powers of Courts of Equity (1915) 15 COL. L. Rav. Io6.
3Raher v. Raher (1gi1) 15o Ia. 511.
'Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714.
5 Ibid.
6 Wyman v. Halstead (I883) iog U. S. 654.
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in which a corporation is domiciled may impose a succession
tax. 7 It has recently been held that in determining the title to
stock, its situs is considered to be in the state in which the cor-
poration in which it is a right or interest, is domiciled." It,
therefore, seems that the situs of the stock is not in Tennessee,
even though the certificates are held there. Thus the Tennessee
court could not render a valid decree in rem concerning the
corporation stock.
Under the "full faith and credit" clause of the Federal Con-
stitution, whenever a judgment of a state court is relied upon in
another state as conclusive, the jurisdiction of the court render-
ing it is open to inquiry, and if it appears that the court had no
jurisdiction the judgment is not entitled to receive full faith and
credit.9
The Kentucky court, therefore, had power to inquire into the
jurisdiction of the Tennessee tribunal. Having found that the
Tennessee court had no power to render the decree concerning
the stock, the Kentucky court, having jurisdiction of both par-
ties, proceeded to decide that Baker's domicile had been in Ken-
tucky and that the property should be distributed according to
Kentucky law.
Following the view that the situs of the stock in the Kentucky
corporation is to be regarded as in Kentucky, the instant case
seems to be entirely correct in allowing the Kentucky law to
govern the distribution of the corporation stock.
F. L. McC.
THE DUE PROCESS AND FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSES AS
APPLIED TO THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
The case of Kryger v. Wilson,' recently decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States, presents an interesting problem in the
applicability of the due process clause2 and the full faith and
7 Matter of Bronson (1896) i5o N. Y. x; Greves v. Shaw (1899) 173
Mass. 205.
8 Holmes v. Camp (1916) 219 N. Y. 359, 114 N. E. 841, and note thereon
in 17 COL. L. REv. 151.
9 Borden v. Fitch (1818) 15 Johns. (N. Y.) 121, 143, 144; Thompson v.
Whitman (1873) 8 Wall. (U. S.) 457.
1 (1916) 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 34.
2 Amend, xvi, sec. I: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law."
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credit clause3 of the Federal Constitution to the conflict of laws.
Vendor and vendee, both residents of the state of Minnesota,
entered into a contract for the sale of land situated in North
Dakota. The contract was executed in Minnesota, and payment
in instalments was to be made there. No money was paid by the
vendee at the time the contract was executed. Both Minnesota
and North Dakota had statutory methods of foreclosure by which
the vendor, through cancellation proceedings, could extinguish
the contract claim of the vendee. The vepdee having defaulted
in the making of payments, the vendor employed the method of
foreclosure prescribed by the Nlorth Dakota statute,4 which pro-
vided that a vendor in a contract for the sale of land may not
cancel and terminate the same upon default, except after written
notice to the vendee, giving him at least thirty days in which
to make good his nonperformance. In accordance with the
further provision of the statute, the vendor gave vendee notice
only by publication in the county in which the land was situated.
In a suit to quiet title, brought by the assignee of the vendor, it
was held by the North Dakota trial court that the discharge of the
contract was governed by the North Dakota law and that it had
been fully discharged by the cancellation proceedings. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of North Dakota, the vendee claiming a
denial of due process of law, the decree of the trial court was
affirmed.5 The vendee then appealed to the Supreme Court of
the United States on the ground that the state courts had de-
prived him of property without due process of law, in holding
that the cancellation proceedings of the vendor in North Dakota,
of which he had had no actual notice, had discharged the contract.
The court held that since the non-resident vendee had appeared in
the suit to quiet title, the North Dakota court had jurisdiction,
and a mere mistake, if any, in applying the wrong rule of conflict
of laws as to the discharge of the contract, that the lex situs
governed rather than the rule of law of the place of making and
performance, did not deprive him of due process of lav as guar-
anteed by the Federal Constitution.
In the examination of the questions involved in the case, we
shall consider: (i) Whether, in general, there can be a denial
of due process of law under the Constitution merely as a result
3 Art. iv, sec. 1: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records and Judicial Proceedings of every other State."
4 N. D. Rev. Codes, 195o, chap. 30, art. 3, PP. 7494-7497.
' Wilson v. Kryger (1914) 29 N. D. 28.
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of error on the part of the totality of state courts; (2) whether,
more specifically, an error by the state courts in determining a
question in the conflict of laws-namely, what rule of law is
applicable to the discharge of a contract-constitutes a denial of
due process of law. Apart from these two considerations dealt
with by the case itself, we shall consider (3) the possible appli-
cation of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution in
the event of a refusal by the North Dakota courts to recognize
the applicability of the Minnesota statute to determine the dis-
charge of the contract entered into and to be performed in the
latter state.
It has become well established that a mere error in a decision,
whether of law or of fact, in a civil or in a criminal case is
not a denial of due process of law.
6 Thus the decision of a
state court involving nothing more than the ownership of prop-
erty, with all the parties in interest before it, cannot be regarded
by the unsuccessful party as a deprivation of property without
due process of law simply because its effect is to deny his claim
to own such property.7 Due process of law does not assure to a
taxpayer the interpretation of state legislation by the executive
officers of a state as against its interpretation by the courts of
the state." When an act admitted to be valid has been miscon-
strued by the court, due process of law has not been violated.
9
Mere error in the administration of a law by a state board is
equally regarded as not constituting a denial of due process of
law.'0 But an error in the administration of a state law may be
so gross,11 a decision may be so fraudulent' 2 or a tribunal may
6 Patterson v. Colorado (i9o7) 205 U. S. 454. Holmes, J., said: "In
general the decision of a court upon a question of law, however wrong,
and however contrary to previous decisions, is not an infraction of the
14th Amend., merely because it is wrong or because earlier decisions are
reversed."
7 Tracy v. Ginzburg (i9o6) 205 U. S. 17o. Harlan, J., said: "Under
the opposite view every judgment of a state court involving merely the
ownership of property could be brought here for review-a result not
to be thought of."
$ Thompson v. Kentucky (x9o7) 2o9 U. S. 34o.
9Central Land Co. v. Laidley (1895) 157 U. S. 103; Penn. R. Co. v.
Hughes (19o3) 191 U. S. 477.
19 Chicago B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock (i9o6) 204 U. S. 585 (error com-
mitted by an administrative board).
21 See H. Schofield, Federal Supreme Court and State Law, 3 ILL. L.
REv. 195; Lent v. Tilson (i8go) 140 U. S. 316.
22 On what constitutes fraud as to administrative board, see Ross v.
Stewart (1913) 227 U. S. 530, 539.
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be so incompetent,13 as to constitute a denial of due process of
law. In the principal case there was no such fraudulent con-
duct or gross error in the administration of a state law as to
constitute a denial of due process within these well-recognized
exceptions.
When the suit to quiet title was instituted in North Dakota, the
court held that while the contract was entered into in Minnesota
between parties residing in that state and was to be perfomed
in Minnesota, the lex situs nevertheless governed; that the pro-
cedure as to the cancellation of the contract related to the remedy
and not to the substantive law governing the relations of the
parties. We may well doubt the correctness of this reasoning.
The secondary obligation of a contract is so intimately con-
nected with the primary obligation, that convenience and logic
require that one set of rules be applied throughout to determine the
nature, extent, and discharge of both the primary and secondary
obligations, whether that single set of rules be the leax loci con-
tractus or the lex loci solutionis, according as the former or the
latter may govern the primary obligations.14 Here the North
Dakota court clearly departed from that principle by subjecting
the vendee to the liability imposed upon him by its statute as to
cancellation rather than the duties and liabilities that were
intended by the lex loci contractus, the Minnesota statute.15
13 See dicta in Jordan v. Massachusetts (1912) 225 U. S. 167, 176.
14 Story, Conflict of Laws, sec. 331 if; Pritchard v. Norton (1882) io6
U. S. 124; Gibbs v. Soci~ti Industrielle (189o) 25 Q. B. D. 399. Lord
Esher, M. R., said: "The general rule as to the law which governs a con-
tract is that the law of the country, either where the contract is made,
or where it is to be so performed as to be considered a contract of
that country, is the law which governs such a contract, not merely with
regards to its construction, but also with regard to all the conditions
applicable to it as a contract." (The italics are the writer's.) Cf. New
York & Cuba Mail S. S. Co. v. Maldonado & Co. (1915) 225 Fed. 353,
Rogers, J., dissenting, correctly asserts that the same law should govern
throughout, "(i) as to the primary obligation of the contract, (2) as to
the secondary obligation of the contract, (3) and as to the discharge of
the secondary obligation." See comment on this case, 25 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 147. In accord see Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld, Individual
Liability of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws (igog) 9 COL. L. Rnv.
492, especially p. 497, note ii. Contra, see J. H. Beale, Cases on the
Conflict of Laws, vol. iii, sec. 97 (summary).
15 Walsh v. Selover, Bates & Co. (1gog) iOg Minn. 136; affirmed in
Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh (1912) 226 U. S. 112. See also Polson v.
Stewart (1896) 167 Mass. 211; True v. Northern Pacific R. Co. (1914)
126 Minn. 72.
COMMENTS
Of course, the principle that the lex loci contractus should govern
throughout is not altered by the existence of a so-called "equita-
ble interest" in the North Dakota land: the rights, privileges
and powers of the vendee against third-persons who take the land
with notice of the existence of the Minnesota contract would be
determined according to the lex situs.
16
The Federal Supreme Court held that the error, if any, that
may have been committed by the North Dakota court in deter-
mining the question of conflict of laws did not constitute a denial
of due process of law. This is in line with the very few authori-
ties to be found in support of that specific problem. It has been
held that where the case turns upon the construction and opera-
tion of the statute of another state and not its validity, a decision
of that problem does not necessarily involve a question of a federal
character.17 In the case of Allen v. Alleghany Co.'
s the plaintiff,
a business corporation created by the laws of North -Carolina, had
not complied with certain statutory requirement of New York
and Pennsylvania, where it had applied for the privilege of doing
business. In a suit brought in New Jersey upon a promissory
note made in New York, it was held that the plaintiff could
enforce the note obligation. When the statute of a state does not
declare the contract to be expressly void, the tendency of judicial
decisions is toward a strict construction in maintaining its validity.
Upon appeal to the Federal Supreme Court, it was held that there
was no federal question involved.
While the doctrine of the lex situs has been well established
in questions of conflict of laws as to property,"
9 and the doctrine
that the lex loci delicti determines both the primary and secondary
rights, has been quite generally followed as to torts,
20 there has
16 Mallette v. Carpenter (ii6) 16o N. W. (Wis.) 182; Fall v. Easton
(1909) 215 U. S. I. See The Effect as Against the Original Defendant and
his Transferees, to be given by the Law of the Situs to a Foreign Decree
ordering the Conveyance of Realty, (917) 26 YALE LAw JouRxAL, 311.
17 Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co. (1902) i87 U. S. 49o; Glenn v.
Garth (1892) 147 U. S. 360o; Lloyd v. Matthews (1894) 155 U. S. 222;
In re Converse (1890) 137 U. S. 624.
's (1904) 196 U. S. 458.
19 Green v. Van Buskirk (1868) 7 Wall. (U. S.) 339.
20 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown (1914) 234 U. S. 542. The
plaintiff sued to recover damages for mental anguish suffered as a result
of defendant's negligent failure to deliver, in Washington, D. C., a tele-
gram sent from South Carolina. In an opinion rendered by Mr. justice
Holmes it was held that the South Carolina statute, which made mental
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been much confusion and variance among state authorities as to
the rule of law applicable to contracts. It is quite improbable,
however, although conceivable, that the United States Supreme
Court would consider an error on the part of a state court in the
application of the wrong rule of conflict of laws as to property
or as to torts, a denial of due process of law. Federal uniform-
ity, in questions relating to the proper interpretation and dis-
charge of contractual obligations, is peculiarly desirable. Yet
the existing confusion among state authorities makes it clearly
more improbable that the Federal Supreme Court will regard an
error committed by a state court in the wrongful application of
the conflict of laws as to contracts, a denial of due process of
law.21
The losing side in the principal case did not allege, as a fact,
the Minnesota 
-statute, as it was at the time the contract was
executed. It is conceivable that the vendee might have pleaded
the Minnesota statute in the North Dakota action, and urged upon
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, that the North Dakota
court failed to give full faith and credit to the Minnesota statute.
The appellant failed to set up a possible contention based on the
full faith and credit clause.
That the conclusiveness of judgments of a sister state does not
depend on mere comity but on constitutional and statutory guar-
antees, has become well established.22  It cannot, however, be
thought established, and has not been established, as yet, that
statutes, considered as "public acts," of one state, are necessarily
to be given equally comprehensive effect in another state.23  A
anguish a cause of action when the tort occurred outside the state, was
an infringement upon the exclusiveness of the control of the United States
over the District of Columbia.
22 See Allen v. Alleghany Co., supra; cf. Finney v. Guy (i902) 189
U. S. 335.ftMills.v. Duryea (1813) 7 Cranch (U. S.) 48x. See History of Art.iv, sec. i of the Constitution, by George P. Costigan, Jr., 4 CoL. L. REv.
470.2 3 There are three possibilities in which the statutes of another state
may be involved: (i) Misconstruction of the statute of another state;held not to be a denial of full faith and credit. Banholzer v. New YorkLife Ins. Co. (i9oo) 178 U. S. 402. (2) Denial of the validity of the
statute of another state; held to be a failure to give full faith and credit,
by dicta in Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra; Eastern Building& Loan Assn. v. Williamson (i9o3) 189 U. S. 122. (3) Determination that
the statute of another state is inapplicable; suggested to be a violation
of the full faith and credit clause, by expressions used in Supreme Council
of the Royal Arcanum v. Green (xgrs) 237 U. S. 531.
COMMENTS
possible significant extension of the full faith and credit clause,
along the lines last indicated, was suggested by the reasoning of
Mr. Chief Justice White in -the comparatively recent case of The
Supreme Council of Royal Arcanun v. Green.24 Had the vendee
in the principal case pleaded the Minnesota statute in the North
Dakota action, and set up the interpretation given it by the Min-
nesota courts, he might have raised again the interesting problem




24 (1gs) 237 U. S. 53i. The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States, claiming that the New York court violated Art. iv,
sec. i of the Federal Constitution. The court, Mr. Chief Justice White
rendering the opinion, reversed the judgment of the New York Court of
Appeals, on the ground that it had failed to give full faith and credit to
the Massachusetts judgment involved in the case, and apparently, though
somewhat ambiguously, on the further ground that full faith and credit
had been denied the Massachusetts charter of the corporation and the
laws of that state to determine the powers of the corporation involved
and the rights and duties of its members:' For a discussion of this case
see "Conflict of Laws and Full Faith and Credit" (1916) 26 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 324.
25 Had the action in the North Dakota courts been between the original
vendor and vendee the latter might conceivably have taken a position 
in
conformity with the following suggested additional possibilities:
(i) A denial of due process of law by the North Dakota "legislative
arm," as such, where a North Dakota statute would per se be a violation
of due process of law. Cf. Pinney v. Nelson (igoi) 183 U. S. 144.
(2) A denial of due process of law by the North Dakota statute as in
excess of its "legislative power" under the Constitution. See Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Browm (1914) 234 U. S. 542.
